One traditional justification for
greater judicial deference to agencies on legal questions in the U. S.
administrative regime is she expertise argument. This justification comports
with traditional understandings about the respective roles of the different
branches of government and agencies’ place in modern government. Agencies, in
this view, are the technical experts that put into operation the policy
judgments made by legislators. Indeed, technical expertise is the raison d’etre
of agencies; by focusing on a particular regulatory field, or sector of the
economy, agencies can do what Congress lacks the time and other institutional
resources to do. Chevron VS National Resources, which presented the question
whether the statutory term "stationary source" referred to an entire
pollution-emitting plant or, rather, to every single smokestack within such a
plant, supplies an apt example of when an agency’s special technical expertise
can aid statutory interpretation. According to the expertise argument,
agencies are deemed to understand even the legal ramifications of the problems
agencies are created to work on. Admittedly, the dichotomy between legal and
factual questions may at times be difficult to maintain, but that observation
argues as much in favor of as it does against Chevron deference.
Agency expertise, however, is not the only common justification. Sometimes
the doctrine is justified also on democratic grounds. According to the
argument from democracy, it is agencies, not courts, that are answerable to both
the executive and the legislative representatives of the citizenry. Because
judges are not elected, while presidents and legislators are, and because
agencies but not judges are accountable to the President and to Congress,
judicial deference to agency decisions enhances the political legitimacy of the
administrative regime.
Finally, Chevron may be justified also in
the name of administrative efficiency or coordination. Before Chevron, different
federal courts in different jurisdictions could interpret the same statutory
provision differently. Multiple interpretations by different federal courts
would mean that the statute "said" different things in those different
jurisdictions. Such confusion could be eliminated by appellate review, but
agencies faced uncertainty pending review, and the possibility of different
interpretations across different appellate circuits remained. Because multiple
agencies do not typically interpret the same statutory language, however,
Chevron deference allows the agency charged with administering a statute to
interpret that statute. One agency, rather than many federal courts, now
resolves ambiguities in the statute that the agency in question is charged to
administer. Such interpretive streamlining not only reduces uncertainty but also
promotes regulatory coordination. Once an agency has settled on a reasonable
interpretation, it can act on the basis of that interpretation
nationally. |
